Notice Board

Prof. Bryson Brown will present Reconsidering Induction on Wednesday, November 26, 2014 at 4:00 p.m. (D-633).

Abstract: Hume’s argument against induction is one of the   key texts of modern philosophy. Following the   triumph of Newton’s physics, it cast considerable   doubt on the status of Newton’s achievement and   shaped the subsequent philosophical debate over   the status and methods of science.  Hume’s   argument has been the target of many responses (for a recent, vigorously wrongheaded critique see Stove, 1986).  But many in the empiricist tradition of philosophy of science have openly despaired of an answer to Hume’s challenge being arrived at.  More recently, John Norton has proposed a ‘material’ account of induction which, he argues, is not subject to Hume’s objections.  I will approach the issue by raising some questions about the assumptions of Hume’s argument: does induction as practiced really proceed as Hume presents it? Are other types of knowledge claim really induction-free?  Further questions emerge from this inquiry: what is the real scope of the problem of induction, that is, what beliefs or knowledge claims do Humean worries about induction undermine?  What does induction come to, in practice, and how do ‘inductive’ conclusions really relate to non-inductive commitments?  I close with some discussion of how answers to these questions relate to Norton’s material account.      

Everyone welcome